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Abstract
In the last decade, deep artificial neural networks have achieved as-
tounding performance in many natural language processing tasks. Given
the high productivity of language, these models must possess effective
generalization abilities. It is widely assumed that humans handle lin-
guistic productivity by means of algebraic compositional rules: Are deep
networks similarly compositional? After reviewing the main innovations
characterizing current deep language processing networks, I discuss a set
of studies suggesting that deep networks are capable of subtle grammar-
dependent generalizations, but also that they do not rely on systematic
compositional rules. I argue that the intriguing behaviour of these de-
vices (still awaiting a full understanding) should be of interest to linguists
and cognitive scientists, as it offers a new perspective on possible compu-
tational strategies to deal with linguistic productivity beyond rule-based
compositionality, and it might lead to new insights into the less systematic
generalization patterns that also appear in natural language.
Keywords: artificial neural networks, deep learning, linguistic produc-
tivity, compositionality
1 Introduction
Neural networks have been a prominent tool to model cognitive phenomena at
the mechanistic level since at least the mid eighties [1]. In the last decade, un-
der their “deep learning” re-branding, neural networks have also proven their
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worth as astonishingly successful general-purpose, large-scale machine-learning
algorithms [2]. In the domain of natural language, today neural networks are
core components of effective machine-translation engines such as Google Trans-
late1 and DeepL.2 OpenAI recently caused controversy when it announced that
it would not make its new language-modeling network publicly available, as it
generates novel text about arbitrary topics that is so realistic and coherent that
it could easily be deployed in malicious applications, such as bulk creation of
faked or abusive content.3 The debate on the linguistic abilities of neural net-
works of the 80s and 90s involved small experiments and theoretical speculation
about whether neural networks would ever be able to process language at scale
(e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], among many others). Given the impressive empirical re-
sults achieved by modern neural networks, the interesting question today is not
whether, but how neural networks achieve their language skills, and what causes
the surprising and sometimes dramatic failures that still affect them [8, 9].
Many early neural networks were developed with the specific purpose of un-
derstanding mental processes, and thus cognitive or biological plausibility was a
central concern. Modern deep networks are instead optimized for practical goals,
such as better translation quality or information extraction. It is thus unlikely
that their behaviour will closely mimic human cognitive processes. I contend,
however, that their high natural language processing performance makes them
very worth studying from the perspective of cognitive science. Following an
early proposal by McCloskey [10], we should treat this as comparative psychol-
ogy. Just like the communication systems of primates and other species can shed
light on the unique characteristics of human language (e.g., [11, 12]), studying
how artificial neural networks accomplish (or fail to accomplish) sophisticated
linguistic tasks can provide important insights on the nature of such tasks, and
the possible ways in which a computational device can (or cannot) solve them.
This is the perspective I adopt here in looking at linguistic productivity and
compositionality in deep networks.
Natural languages are characterized by immense productivity, in the sense
that they license a theoretically infinite set of possible expressions. Linguists
almost universally agree that compositionality, the ability to construct larger
linguistic expressions by combining simpler parts, subtends productivity. The
focus is typically on semantic compositionality, the principle whereby the mean-
ing of a linguistic expression is a function of the meaning of its components and
the rules used to combine them [13, 14]. When studying the generalization prop-
erties of neural networks, I believe it is more useful to consider a broader notion
of compositionality, also encompassing, for example, the syntactic derivation
rules allowing us to judge the grammaticality of nonce sentences independently
of their meaning [15, 16]. Indeed, compositionality is conjectured to be a land-
mark not only of language but of human thought in general [17, 5, 8], and the
compositional abilities of neural networks have been tested on tasks that are not
semantic [7] or even linguistic in nature [18]. If a system is not compositional in
1https://translate.google.com/
2https://www.deepl.com/translator
3https://openai.com/blog/better-language-models/
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this more general sense, it will not, a fortiori, be able to build complex semantic
representations by parallel composition of syntactic and semantic constituents.
Compositional operations in language (and thought) are argued to consti-
tute a rule-based algebraic system, of the sort that can be formally captured
by symbolic functions with variable slots. It follows that compositionality is
“systematic”, in the sense that a function must apply in the same way to all
variables of the right type. As famously put by Fodor, if you know the correct
compositional rules to understand “John loves Mary”, you must also under-
stand “Mary loves John” [5] (Fodor and colleagues distinguish systematicity
and compositionality: simplifying somewhat, they see compositionality, in the
stricter semantic sense presented above, as the natural consequence of applying
systematic rules in the domain of natural language). Neural networks are not
thought to be capable of acquiring systematic rules. Their linguistic generaliza-
tion abilities have thus been the focus of much research in the past (see, e.g.,
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23] among many others). Note that productivity per se does not
entail systematic compositionality. Some forms of generalization outside lan-
guage are not rule-based (and not systematic). For example, similarity-driven
reasoning about concept instances is probably too fuzzy and prototype-based
to be accounted for by systematic rules [24]. One could also imagine a language
that is productive but not (systematically) compositional. For example, Hock-
ett [25], reflecting about the origins of language, conjectured a stage in which
new expressions are formed not by systematic composition of smaller parts, but
by blending unanalyzed wholes in inconsistent ways. Modern languages also ex-
hibit many corners of non-systematic, partial productivity, a point I’ll return to
in the conclusion. Still, systematic composition rules are an extremely powerful
generalization mechanism. Once you know that super- attaches to adjectives
to form other adjectives, you can in principle understand an infinite (if rather
contrived) set of words: super-good, super-super-good, etc. In this context, it
has been argued that lack of compositionality is one reason why modern neu-
ral networks, in striking contrast to humans, require huge amounts of data to
induce correct generalizations [8].
In this article, I would like to introduce researchers interested in composition-
ality from a cognitive perspective to some relevant recent work about linguistic
productivity in modern deep networks. After briefly reviewing the main novel-
ties characterizing current deep language-processing architectures, I will present
experimental evidence that these systems are at the same time able to capture
subtle syntactic generalizations about novel forms (thus handling a sophisti-
cated form of grammatical productivity), and failing to show convincing signs
of rule-based compositionality. I will conclude with some considerations about
the significance of these results for the general study of linguistic productivity.
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Figure 1: Architectural features of modern sequence-processing networks. (a) A
traditional recurrent network processing a sequence of words in multiple time
steps. The arrows represent sets of weighted connections (a single arrow stands
for multiple unit-to-unit connections). The 3 green circles represent the same
network at different time steps, which might be structured into multiple layers
(not depicted in the figure). The output at time t is a (non-linear) function of
the current input as well as the state of the network at time t−1 (information is
carried through time by the recurrent connections represented by vertical arrows
in the figure). (b) In modern sequence-processing networks, a set of gates
modulate the amount of information flowing through the connections of the
network. (c) The encoder-decoder architecture is modular, with separate sub-
networks (in yellow and green in the figure) trained to process input (encoder)
and generate output (decoder). The decoder is typically initialized from the
last state of the encoder. (d) In attention-enhanced architectures, the state
of the encoder at each time step is separately stored in memory, and at each
decoding step the network dynamically determines how much information to
read from each of the memory slots. The figure schematically depicts the step in
which the decoder makes a prediction based on the last word it produced (com),
its previous state and attention-mediated memorized states from the decoder
(with line thickness symbolizing the relative weight assigned to each memorized
state). Unlike the previous diagrams, this one only shows the connections that
are active in the last depicted processing step.
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2 Modern deep networks for language process-
ing: what has changed
Much of the last-decade improvements in neural network performance are due
to the availability of larger training data sets that, together with computational
power and better optimization methods, enabled large-scale data-driven training
of complex, multi-layer architectures [2, 26]. In the domain of language, large
corpora made it possible to train networks with the simple language modeling
method [27, 28]. In this setup, the weights of a sequence-processing network
are set by optimizing the objective of predicting the next word in a text, given
the previous context. This is schematically illustrated for a recurrent network in
Fig. 1(a). Nowadays, language modeling is used as a general-purpose way to pre-
train networks to perform linguistic tasks [29]. It is also an interesting training
regime from a cognitive point of view, since humans in many cultures are also
exposed to large amounts of raw language data during acquisition (e.g., [30]),
and predicting what comes next plays a central role in cognition [31, 32, 33, 34].
Of course, prediction is not the only task humans perform when learning a
language, and how to design more varied and human-like training environments
is an open research issue.
Important advances have also been made in architectural terms. The origi-
nal sequence-processing recurrent network schematically illustrated in Fig. 1(a)
reads some input (e.g., a word), and produces an output (e.g., a guess about
the next word) at each time step. The output of the network at time t is a
non-linear function of the input at time t, as well as of the state of the network
itself at step t−1 (weighted by recurrent connections that propagate activations
across time) [35].
Gated recurrent networks, such as long short-term memory networks [36]
and gated recurrent units [37], possess mechanisms regulating the dynamics of
information processing across time, whose parameters are jointly induced with
the rest of the network in the training phase. In particular, the network gates
can “decide”, at each time step and for each unit, how much it should be up-
dated with information about the current input (vs. preserving currently stored
information), and how much it should contribute to (the hidden representation
determining) the current output. Such gating mechanisms, schematically illus-
trated in Fig. 1(b), allow longer-term and more nuanced control of the informa-
tion flow. Gates have proven empirically extremely effective, and are standard
in modern language-processing networks [38].
Another important innovation consisted in decoupling input and output pro-
cessing through encoder-decoder architectures [39]. As sketched in Fig. 1(c),
separate sub-networks are trained to process the input and generate the output,
with the last state of the first network (the encoder) used to initialize the second
(the decoder). Input-output decoupling allows effective handling of sequence-
to-sequence tasks, in which a sequence (e.g., a sentence in a language) has to be
mapped onto another sequence (e.g., a sentence in another language), especially
where input and output sequences are very different. This approach is by now
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standard in machine translation (where, for example, it permits flexible map-
ping between languages with different word orders), but it is extremely general,
and it has for example also been employed to convert linguistic instructions to
actions and sentences to semantic representations [40, 41].
A (learned) attention mechanism, in its original form [42], automatically
allows the decoder to read more or less information from different encoder states
(on the basis of similarity computations between vectors representing current
and past states). As schematically illustrated in Fig. 1(d), when it is about to
translate the word following com (“how” in Catalan), an attention-augmented
network might decide to read more from the encoder state corresponding to the
word that immediately follows come (“how”) in the Italian source. Attention
plays an increasingly important role in modern encoder-decoder architectures, to
the point that the most successful contemporary models dispense with recurrent
connections altogether, and rely instead on a rich attention mechanism to keep
track of relevant past information [43].
Modern sequence-processing networks are complex systems, equipped with
strong structural priors such as gates, encoding and decoding modules and at-
tention. They should not be thought of as “tabulae rasae”, as they often were
in early debates on connectionism. At the same time, the “innate” biases they
encode are rather different from those assumed to shape human linguistic com-
petence. Some researchers are trying to inject into modern networks priors
closer to those traditionally postulated by linguists, such as a preference for
hierarchical tree structures, (e.g., [44, 45]; see also Brennan’s contribution to
this issue). Models of this latter kind have however not yet proven their worth
as generic language processing devices, and I will not delve further into them.
Intriguingly, [46] recently found that, when such models are not provided with
explicit information about conventional compositional derivations, they come
up with tree structures that do not resemble those posited by linguists at all.
This is in line with the basic tenet of this paper, that neural networks might
solve complex linguistic tasks, but not in the way we expect them to be solved.
3 Colorless green grammatical generalization in
deep networks
There is no doubt that modern language-processing neural networks can gen-
eralize beyond their training data. Without such ability, their astounding per-
formance in machine translation [43, 47] would remain unexplained, as most
sentences, or even long word sequences, in any text to be translated are ex-
tremely unlikely to have ever been produced before [48]. Recently, there has
been widespread interest in understanding whether this performance depends on
shallow heuristics, or whether the networks are indeed capturing grammar-based
generalizations, of the sort that would be supported by symbolic compositional
rules (e.g., [49, 50, 51]).
Gulordava and colleagues [52] test the networks’ grammatical “intuitions” in
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a setup that is strictly controlled to insure they are tapping into their produc-
tive competence (as opposed to memorized patterns). They train a gated recur-
rent network on large Wikipedia-derived corpora, using the language modeling
objective. They then feed it minimal pairs of sentences respecting/violating
long-distance number agreement. Crucially, the test items are semi-randomly
generated nonsense sentences. For example, one minimal pair is: “I realize the
wars on which I should revise your hunt understand/understands” (here,
the plural verb variant with with understand is the grammatical one). The
model, without further task-specific tuning, is tasked with computing the prob-
ability of the two variants, and it is said to have produced the correct judgment if
it assigns a higher probability to the grammatical one. Gulordava’s nonsensical
twist strips off possible semantic, lexical and collocational confounds, focusing
on the abstract grammatical generalization.
Gulordava and colleagues run the experiment in English, Hebrew, Italian and
Russian. In all cases, neural networks display a preference for the grammatical
sentences that is well above chance level and competitive baselines (the lowest
performance occurs in English, where the network still guesses correctly 74% of
the cases, where chance level is at 50%). Moreover, for Italian, they compare the
network performance to human subjects taking the same test. Human accuracy
turns out to be only marginally above that of the network (88.4% vs. 85.5%).
These results suggest that neural networks capture abstract, structure-based
grammatical generalizations. However, the evidence is indirect, and others
[53, 54] have suggested that the networks are really capitalizing on shallow
heuristics (such as: “percolate the number of the first noun in a sentence to all
verbs”). Lakretz and colleagues [55] conducted extensive ablation and connec-
tivity studies of the Gulordava network. They found that the network special-
ized very few units to the task of carrying long-distance number information.
For example, when the activation of these units is fixed to 0, the network per-
formance on agreement tasks slide towards chance level. Importantly, these
units are strongly connected to a sub-network of nodes that can be indepen-
dently shown to be sensitive to hierarchical syntactic constituency. Unveiling
this circuit in the network suggests that the latter has indeed developed gen-
uine grammatical processing mechanisms, and it is not simply relying on surface
heuristics when computing agreement.
The kind of productivity that was probed in these studies is grammatical
in nature. Just like in Chomsky’s famous “colorless green ideas” example [15],
Gulordava’s network can tell apart subtly different grammatical and ungram-
matical nonsensical sentences, that are certainly very far from anything it was
exposed to during training. Lakretz’ analysis of the network further suggests
that its behaviour relies on genuine sensitivity to grammatical structure. The
traditional linguistic story about a cognitive device displaying this behaviour
would be that it possesses a compositional rule-based system, allowing it to re-
liably process novel linguistic input (such as Gulordava’s stimuli). We have no
evidence, yet, about whether Gulordava’s network possesses something akin to
such system, but we will now turn to experiments with similar networks directly
probing their compositionality through a miniature language designed for this
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purpose, that suggest that they don’t.
4 Compositional generalization: can deep net-
works dax twice?
Lake and Baroni [56] introduced SCAN, a benchmark to test the compositional
abilities of sequence processing networks, later extended by [57]. The SCAN
miniature language is characterized by a grammar generating a large but fi-
nite number of linguistic navigation commands, and an interpretation function
associating a semantic representation (a sequence of action symbols) to each
possible command. The primitives of the language are verbs such as jump and
run, mapped to the corresponding actions (e.g., JUMP, RUN). Primitives are
combined with a set of adverb-like modifiers and conjunctions, resulting in com-
posite expressions denoting action sequences. For example, if [[x]] is the action
associated to expression “x” by the interpretation function, then “x and y” maps
to [[x]] [[y]] and “x twice” maps to [[x]] [[x]]. Consequently, “jump twice and
run” is compositionally mapped to the action sequence: JUMP JUMP RUN.
The general evaluation paradigm is as follows. An encoder-decoder network
is trained on a set of SCAN commands for long enough that the network learns
to accurately execute them (that is, to map them to the corresponding action
sequences). The network performance is then evaluated on executing a set of
test commands that were not encountered during training. Note that, unlike
in the experiments reviewed in the previous section, where it had to assign
a probability to pre-determined sentences, here the network has to actively
produce an output action sequence, thus its generative abilities are more directly
probed.
By splitting the possible SCAN commands into different training and testing
partitions, we can gain insights into what the network is actually learning. I
will focus here on the results obtained with 3 of the proposed splits, and their
implications. In the random split, 80% of the commands are used for train-
ing, the remaining 20% for testing. This split checks the network ability to
handle generic productivity (of the sort that might occur in standard machine-
translation benchmarks), since all test expressions are new for the network.
However, there is no controlled difference between the two sets, and the net-
work will in general have seen a number of examples quite similar to those it
has to execute. For example, the test set contains the command “look around
left twice and jump right twice”. This is new, but the training data contain
examples of “look around left twice” and “jump right twice”, both on their own
and in conjoined expressions (e.g., “look around left twice and turn left”,
“run twice and jump right twice”).
In the jump split, the training set contains all possible commands with all
primitives except jump. During training, jump is presented multiple times,
but only in isolation. The test set is then made of all composite commands
containing jump. For example, at training the network is exposed to “run twice”
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and “walk and look”, and at test time it must execute “jump twice” and “walk
and jump”. The split is straightforward for a system possessing composition
rules such as: “x twice” maps to [[x]] [[x]]. This is akin to a human subject
learning a new verb daxing, and being immediately able to understand what
“dax twice” means.
However, since jump only occurs in isolation at training time, the tested
specimen could also reasonably conclude that the latter has a different distribu-
tion from the other verbs, and refuse to generalize it to novel composite contexts
[58]. Loula and colleagues [57] introduce different partitions that control for this
factor. In particular, in the around-right split, the training data contain all pos-
sible commands, except those where around is combined with right. Still, the
network is given plenty of distributional evidence that right and left function
identically otherwise, and it is exposed to many examples illustrating the be-
haviour of around in combination with left. The training data contain, a.o., the
commands “run left”, “run right”, “jump opposite left”, “jump opposite right”,
“look around left”. The test data include “look around right”.
The results in the original papers, and the further experiments of [59] with
more carefully-tuned models, tell a simple story. Modern recurrent sequence-
processing networks, just like conjectured by Jerry Fodor and Gary Marcus, are
able to generalize in a fuzzy, similarity-based way that allows them to succeed in
the random split (100% average test accuracy and s.d. ≈ 0.0% across multiple
runs with different initializations). However, they utterly fail at the jump and
around-right splits, that require inducing systematic compositional rules (12.5%
accuracy with 6.6% s.d. and 2.5% accuracy with 2.7% s.d., respectively).
In very recent work, Dess`ı and Baroni [60] found a somewhat more intriguing
pattern. They replaced the gated recurrent network architectures used in earlier
SCAN work with an out-of-the-box convolutional network that dispenses with
recurrence by heavily relying on attention, and that has independently been
shown to achieve competitive results in machine translation ([61]; Dess`ı and
Baroni were not able, for the time being, to trace the difference in performance
between this network and the previously tried models back to their architectural
differences). The new model is still able to perfectly generalize in the random
split (100% test accuracy, s.d. ≈ 0.0%), but now it reaches a surprising middle
ground in the “compositional” splits: 69.2% accuracy (8.2% s.d.) with jump and
56.7% (10.2% s.d.) with around-right. As chance level accuracy in these tasks
is practically 0%, the results show that the network does get some important
generalizations right. Still, if it extracted the correct rules, we would expect
it to be perfectly accurate, which is not the case. Dess`ı and Baroni initially
conjectured that the network learned a subset of compositional rules, explaining
its partial success. For example, it could be that the network learned how to
map “x twice” to [[x]] [[x]], but failed to learn the corresponding “x thrice” rule.
However, a follow-up error analysis showed this not to be the case. The network
makes errors relatively uniformly across composition frames, and, qualitatively,
it does not display any trace of systematicity. For example, in the jump split
the network executes “jump left after walk” correctly, but fails “jump left after
run”. In the around-right split, the network can execute “run around right”,
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but not “walk around right”.
Similar conclusions were drawn by Andreas [62] from a very different ex-
periment. Andreas trained sender and receiver sequence-processing networks to
play a “communication game”: The sender must describe the properties of a set
of objects to the receiver through a discrete communication channel, and the
receiver must reconstruct the correct target objects. The agents were trained by
rewarding successful communication. Across random initializations, the sender
agent developed more or less compositional codes for its messages to the re-
ceiver. Interestingly, at least some codes with low degrees of compositionality
were as good at generalizing to new object descriptions as more compositional
ones. Again, neural networks can be productive without being compositional.
5 Conclusion
When critics of classic connectionism argued that neural networks are intrin-
sically incapable to induce symbolic composition rules, they probably assumed
that this would severely limit their practical ability to handle natural language.
The empirical evidence concerning modern deep networks is surprising, as it
suggests that they are extremely proficient at language, while indeed not being
compositional. Note in particular that the experiments by Gulordava, Lakretz
and others I reviewed in Section 3 above suggest that the linguistic proficiency
of neural networks extends beyond shallow pattern recognition, to competence
about structure-dependent generalizations of the sort traditionally attributed
to the command of systematic compositional rules. Our current understanding
of the strategies learned by these networks is very limited, and our highest pri-
ority should be to develop better analytical tools to uncover the mechanisms
that lead to the detected dissociation of productive grammatical competence
and systematic compositionality.
From the perspective of AI research, one central question is whether making
neural networks more compositional, for example by means of more structured
modular architectures [63], will also make them more adaptive and faster at
learning, while not costing in terms of generality. Current deep networks are also
brittle in surprising ways. For example they are easily fooled by “adversarial”
examples (e.g., words with a few characters shifted) that would be trivially
handled by humans [e.g., 64, 65, 66]. Explicitly compositional architectures
might provide added robustness to similar attacks, or at least afford better
insights into the often mysterious failings of the networks. In turn, this might
lead to progress in ambitious natural language processing tasks where the success
of modern deep networks are less clear-cut, such as machine reading and natural
language inference [e.g., 67, 68].
Still, the way in which current models generalize without possessing anything
resembling compositional rules also offer an intriguing opportunity for compar-
ative studies to linguists and cognitive scientists. Classic and modern criticism
of neural networks emphasizes the aspects of human language that are best
characterized by clear-cut, algebraic rules. Language, however, is also host to
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plenty of productive phenomena that obey less systematic, fuzzier laws, ranging
from phonologically-driven generalizations of irregular inflections [69], to par-
tial semantic transparency in derivational morphology [70], to semi-lexicalized
constraints in syntax [71], to the early stages of grammaticalization in language
change [72]. Progress in understanding the linguistic capabilities of neural net-
works might help us to make precise predictions about the origin, scope and
mechanics of these phenomena, and ultimately to develop a more encompassing
account of the amazing productivity and malleability of human language.
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